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Abstract
This paperstudies sales promotion through coupons in an oligopolistic market.
Sending out coupons allows the sellers to separate market segments with different
degrees ofconsumer btand loyalty. This kind ofprice discrimination is profitable for
the individual seller when the cost ofcouponing is sufficiently low. In equilibrium,
however, couponing increases competition and reduces profits. The paperprovides
comparative statics results and studies welfare implications.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies sales promotion through coupons and rebates in an oligopolistic indus-
try. Sales promotion is a complementary, and in cases even more ímportant marketing
strategy than media advertising for a firm Lo increase its market share. Coupons and
rebates count for the bulk of billion of dollars spent each year on t.hese promotional
activities. Manufacturers in the US distributed 310 billion coupons in 1992, representing
an 6alo increase over the year before (see Hume (1993)). Rebates are virtually equivalent
to coupons except that they impose some additional redemption cost on the customer,
namely the cost of mailing and waiting for the cash refund. For our purposes coupons
and rebates play the same role and we will treat them interchangeably in our analysis.
We investigate the role of coupons in a market that is segmented due to location,
brand loyalty, or access to product information. By offering a rebate, a manufacturer
is able to attract some consumers who are otherwise more inclined Lo buy a competing
brand. Consumc~rs differ in Lheir degree of brand loyalt.y. In the locat.ion interpretation
o( our modcl, they have different transportation costs. Sending out coupons is costly
for the seller, and this cost increases as he targets to reach a higher percentage of the
competing brand's consumers. By price discriminating between his own customers and
the clientele of competing manufacturers, the seller can increase his own market share.
We study the optimal marketing behaviour of the oligopolists in a game where prices,
coupon values, and the levels of coupon distribution are chosen simultaneously. We re-
strict our analysis to the case where consumers are fully informed about all prices.
An empirical illustration of how firms use coupons to expand their market share is
the classic struggle between I'Br.C-Folger and the General Foods Corporation. Before
Fulger was acquired by PRrC in 19G.3, it ope~rated urainly west of tho Mississippi where
it had a Icading share in the local cofíee industry. ln 197'l aud 1973 holge~r rnoved iutu
Cleveland and Philadelphia with an advertising campaign that included sending 25 cents
off coupons to more than a million households. The Maxwell House Division of General2
Foods react.ed by mailing 50-cent coupons to households in Clcveland. I,ati~r, siniilar
counter-attacks were launched when PBtG entered other markets in the East. Overall,
General Foods succeeded in defending its market, but at a high cost.
With couponing the manuCacturer has at least partial control of the type of household
reached. T'hus he is able to offer a reduced price to a specific segment of the market.
Coupons can serve as a price discrimination device. Only those consumers who have
received a coupon are able to benefit from the rebate. Since this enables the manu-
facturer to separate market segments, coupons are more than just a low price offered
to all consumers. An alternative explanation of coupons has been proposed by Cremer
(1984) and Caminal and Matutes (1990). In these models, coupons create a lock-in effect.
because the consumer is o(fered a rebate on future purchases of the product. The seller
can stabilize his market share by creating ari artificial cost of switching suppliers. This
is in direct contrast with our model, where coupons tend to make switching more attrac-
tive. Yet another explanation (Gerstner and Hess (1991)) is that the seller can motivate
retailer participation in the sales promotion by offering rebates to the consumers.
The literature on the price discrimination aspects of coupons is rather scarce.
Narasimhan (1984) studies the consumers' decision to use a coupon. Only consumers
with a sufficiently low opportunity cost of time take advantage oí coupons. Thus price
discrimination can be achieved through self-selection. Caminal and Matutes (1990) is,
to our knowledge, the only study of oligopolistic behaviour, but in a repeat purchase
context.. In t.heir model Lhe consurner receives a rebate only after purchasing a second
unit from the same seller. The role of coupons is to create a switching cost in the second
period. If the firms precommit to a discount, competition in that period is decreased
and the equilibrium profits inrrcasc.
In contrast, in our model coupons increase competition between firrns. Each individ-
ual seller has an incentive to reduce the brand loyalty of the other firms' clientele in order
to increase his market share. But, offering a rebate amounts to reducing the consumers'3
switching cost and so competition is intensified. In equilibrium, each seller's profits are
lower than if coupons or price discrimination were not allowed. Price discrimination
in combination with oligopolistic competition leads to lower prices; the consumers as a
whole are better off when the sellers compete by using coupons.
The finding that firm profits may be lower as a result of price discrimination is similar
to the findings of Thisse and Vives (1988). They show that discrimination is a dominant
strategy for each firm. Yet, it leads to lower profits than a uniform price. Levy and
Gerlowski (1991) show that "meeting competition clausesn, whereby a seller announces
to meet the competitor's price, may reduce equilibrium profits. One may view such
clauses as a special type of coupon; they allow the seller to discriminate between those
consumers who only receive his own ad and those who receive ads also from other firms.
In our model the manufacturers use coupons as long as the marginal cost of distribut-
ing coupons are iiot too hígh. Under certain assumptions on distribution costs, there
is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, as couponing becomes more ex-
pensive, the firms' profits increase, while consumer welfare decreases. This is so because
a higher cost of price discrimination reduces competition between the firms. The sellers'
profits increase and consumer welfare decreases also when the consumers become more
heterogeneous. The intuition is that a higher degree of brand loyalty reduces the firms'
incentive to use coupons as a discrimination device, which in turn leads to higher average
prices for the consumers.
The following Section presents a simplified example, where we abstract from the
costs of issuing coupons and from differences in the consumers' degree of brand loyalty.
Section 3 describes the general model. We study the equilibrium marketing behaviour of
the firms in Section 4. Section 5 provides some comparative statics and welfare tesults.
All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.4
2 An Example
T'o illustrate the main features of our analysis, we first present a simplified example of the
more general model studied in the following sections. We study a duopoly market char-
acterized by some segmentation according to location, brand loyalty, or access to product
information. Using the language of the locational application, the model considers the
following situation: There are two sellers, A and B, located in different neighbourhoods
of some geographical market. The sellers' production costs are normalized to zero. In
each localit.y, there is a unit mass of consumers with a totally inelastic demand for
one unit of the good for all prices between zero and v 1 0. When a consumer purchases
the good from the seller in the distant location, he has to pay a transportation cost s c v.
Shilony (1977) studies the equilibrium of this market when the sellers compete by
setting prices in a standard Bertrand fashion. If v C 2s, both sellers will post the
price p" - v in equilibrium. Undercutting the competitor's price is not profitable since
this would yield a profit of at most 2(v - s) G v. The price setting game between the
duopolists fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium if v 7 2s. Indeed, any combination of
prices (pA, pB ) would allow one of the two sellers to gain either by undercutting the other
seller or by increasing his price by some small amount. Shilony (1977) shows that that
there is a unique symmetric mixed strategy solution where each seller gains an expected
profit higher than s.
~Ve now introduce oligopolistic price discrimination. Even though the seller is un-
able Lo identify thc origin of the customers at his store, he can separate t,hem through
coupons. 't:ach seller is able to offer the good at different prices in the two regions by
mailing coupons to the other region. Coupons enta:l a legally binding promise by the
seller to offer a rebate upon presentation. In our example, we abstract from mailing
costs and assume that seller i can costlessly send coupons to all consumers in region j.
The coupon entitles its owner to buy the good from seller i at the price p; - r;, while
buyers without a coupon have to pay p;.In this sirnple example, competition betwc~en the duopolists, A and f3, results in the
following equilibrium outcome:
PA-Pa-P~-s~ ra-ra-r'-s. (1)
Each consumer is indifferent between buying the good from seller A or seller B. If he
buys at the neighbouring store, has to pay the price p' - s; otherwise, has to pay
p' - r' - 0 but incurs the transportation cost s. In equilibrium, it must be the case that
each consumer buys at the local store. If not, the local seller would have an incentive
to lower his price slightly below s. Clearly, the outcorne described by (1) constitutes an
equilibrium: By charging a price above s a seller would lose all his customers. Charging
a price below s can never be optimal, since each seller enjoys a local monopoly position
for all prices up to s. Actually, the equilibrium is uniyue: If some seller i would charge
a price p; ~ s, then the opponent could induce all consumers in region i to switch by
offering p~ - r~ sl~ghtly below p, - s. Accordingly, a price p, 1 s cannot. be part of eyui-
librium behaviou-. The same argument shows that both sellers must offer the rebate
r' - s. Obviousl~, given p' this is the highest rebate a seller is willing to offer. If seller
i sets r; C s, then seller j would optimally charge his local customers some price p~ ~ s,
which was already shown to be inconsistent with equilibrium.
The example demonstrates that price discrimination increases competition. The con-
sumers have to pay lower prices and the firms' profits are reduced. Indeed, each seller
carns a prufiL of .v, which is luwcr Lhan Lhc proÍil. hc, gcts in thc abscncc of discrirnina-
tory pricing. In thc following, we will verify this observation in a rnore geueral model.
In fact, the above example has some unappealing features because the consumers' pur-
chasing decisions have to be based on a tie-breaking rule. Even though the equilibrium
requires both sellers to use coupons, this marketing instrument is actually ineffective
since no consumer is induced to switch. If the sellers had to pay a mailing cost, the
above equilibrium would therefore collapse. The subsequent model will overcome these
difficulties by introducing some consumer heterogeneity.G
3 The Model
Following Shilony (1977), we study a tnarket where. conswners can purchase costlessly
from a neighbourhood store, but incur some visiting cost if they venture a more distant
store. There are two firms located in different regions, A and B, that produce a homo-
geneous good at zero cost. Each region is inhabited by a unit mass of consumers who
have a common reservation utility v for the good. F,ach consumer can costlessly visit
the store at his home location, while he has to pay a transportation cost s to go to the
other seller. It is assumed that s is uniformly distributed on [0, s] across the population
of consumers in each region. This assumption differs from Shilony's (1977) model oí
mixed pricing in oligopoly, where all consumers have the same visiting cost. It generates
continuous demand functions, which are a prerequisite for the existence of a pure price
setting equilibrium (see Bester ( 1992)).
The firms offer the good at the price pA and pB, respectively. Without loss of gen-
erality, let 0 C p; C v, i- A, B. The seller cannot distinguish buyers from different
regions once they enter the store. Similarly, he is uniformed about the visiting cost of
the individual buyer. This means, he cannot make his price offer contingent on such
information. But, seller i may promote purchases by offering the consumers at location
j~ i a rebate r;, with 0 C r; C p;. The seller may offer such rebates by mailing coupons
to the other region. When firm i sends coupons to a fraction a; E[0, 1] of the consumers
at location j, it has to pay the mailing cost k(a;). Each consumer is equally likely to
rc~ci~iw~ Lhe rc~óat~~. 'I'his means, with probabilit.y a, a consumcr in rcgion j has to pay
ouly p, - r, for Lhe giwd availabh~ at location i. "1'h~~ buyer who has not rcci~ived a coupon
is noL t~ntilh~d 1.o a rcbate and has Lu pay p,. Wc assunu, LhaL constun~~rs du not iuteracl.
with each other so that trading coupons is not possible.
The marketing strategy of firm i may be described by x; -(p;, r;,~;). The cost
function k(.) is assumed to satisfy the following restrictions:
k(0) - 0, k'(a) 1 0, k"(a) ~ 0, k'(0) G s~4, k'(1) , s~9. (2)7
The marginal cost of couponing is increasing in the number of households reached.
This assumption is standard in the advertising literature (see Butters (1977) and Gross-
man and Shapiro ( 1989)). The underlying idea is that thP manufacturer can distributr`
coupons via mail and by placing ads in a set of magazines or newspapers. The probabil-
ity that a given consumer receives a coupon through one of these media is independent
of receiving a coupon through the other media. In this case, the cost of making sure
that a fraction a of consumers receives at least one coupon becomes a convex function
oí a. The additional assumptions on k'(.) guarantee that each manufacturer will choose
some advertising intensity 0 C 1; G I. In addition, we restrict the analysis to the case
v~ s. This ensures that competition is sufficiently strong so that setting p; - v cannot
be optimal for seller i.
4 Equilibrium
We assume that each consumer is aware of the availability of the good in both regions. In
addition he knows Lhe price charged by each of the sellers. In this situation, advertising
conveys no information about the existence or the price of a good. Distributing coupons
only serves to price discriminate between buyers from different regions. By offering a
rebate the seller increases the attractiveness of his product for those consumers who have
to spend the cost s in order to visit his store.
To compute each seller's demand, one has to distinguish four groups of consumers:
ln eacli of the two mgions thc~ purchasing decision of thc consurners who have received
a coupon diffen from those without a coupon. A consumer at locatiou A who has
not received a coupon frorn firm B purchases the good at his home location as long as
pA C pB -~ s. If, however, he gets a coupon of value r~, he will buy from seller A only
if pq C pB - rg f s. When consumer s at location B is not offered a rebate, he will be
attracted by firm A's price offer if pA f s C pB. Otherwise, with a coupon rA, he will
purchase from firm A if pA - rA ~- s C pB.Given the consumers' demand decisions, firm A's profit HA(xA, xB) depends on both
firms' sales strategies and is given by
HA(xA, xB) - PA(1 - aB)D(S - PA t pe) ~ PAaBD(s - PA f PB - rB)
fPA(1 -~A)D(PB - PA) f(PA - rA)~AD(PB - PA f rA) - k(~A),
where
(3)
D(z) - z~s for 0 C z C s, D(z) - 0 for z C 0, and D(z) - 1, for z 1 s. (4)
By symmetry, firrn B's profit equals HB(xA,xB) - lIA(xB,xA). To study equilibrium
advertising in this market, we consider the Nash equilibrium in the sellers' game. Thus
a pair (xA,xB) of marketing strategies constitutes an equilibrium if IIA(xA,xB) ~
IIA(xA,xB) for all xA, and IIB(xA,xA) ~ IIB(xA,xB) for all xB.
Our first result provides a characterizationof the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Let (xA, x~) 6e an equiliórium such that xA - xR -(P, r", a'). Then
(p',r',a') is given by the unique solution to
P- S~(1 -h 0.5a'), r~ - 0-5P , k~(~~) - P~(4 -F 2a').
Figure 1 illustrates that the equilibrium is indeed unique: The P- P schedule de-
picts all p- a combinations such that p- s~(1 f 0.5a); the K- K schedule describes
the function p- k'(~)(4 f 2a). Assumption (1) ensures that the two functions intersect
at some point (p',a`) within the area (O,s) x(0,1). This intersection determines the
equilibrium values p' and a'.
With the help of Figure 1 we can easily establish some comparative statics propertie~s
of the equilibrium outcome (li ,r',a'). For instanee, an increase iu Lhe rnarginal cost.
k'(.) leads to a higher equilibrium price p' and a lower level of advertising a' because the
K- K schedule is shifted upwards. How does the equilibrium react to a change in the
consumers' transportation cost? Increasing the parameter s is equivalent to increasing9
Flgute 1: Equilibrium (p', ~')
each consumer's switching cost by the same íactor. In Figure 1 this leads to an upward
shift of the P- P schedule. Conse.quently, both p' and ~' are increased.
Not all consumers who are couponed will makc~ use of the rebate. 1{irdeeming Lhc
coupon is worthwhile only when s C r' - p' - r'. Accordiugly, the redernption rate is
(p' - r')~s - 1~(2 t a'). That is, more than one half of the coupons is not returned to
the manufacturer. Using the above comparative statics results, it follows that the equi-
librium redemption rate is increasing in the marginal cost of couponing. A cost increase
reduces the number of households that are couponed, but the fraction of households
that redeem the coupon is increased. An increase in the consumers' transportation cost
has the opposite effect: More households are couponed, but a lower fraction returns the
coupon. Note, however, that the total number of coupons actually redeemed is given by
a`~(2f ~'), which is increasing in a'. This number is, therefore, negatively related to the
niargiual cozl. of coupuning anii posit.ivcly relal.cd lo Lhc Icvcl ofcousuini~r swilching cost.s.
Of course, the result that the coupon oífers a 50"~u price rebate is specific to the setting
of our model. In particular, the uniform distribution of switching costs is important in
this context. One can show that the sellers would optimally offer a lower rebate if the
distribution of s puts more weight on low switching costs. The intuition is that attracting
high cost consumers through a rebate is not profitable when these consumers represent
only a small fraction of the total population.10
Proposition 1 only provides an implicit characterization of the equilibrium values
p', r', and a'. To obtain an explicit solution of the equilibrium, one has to look at a
parametric example of the cost function k(.). The simplest example is k(a) - ca3. This
function satisfies restriction ('l) if c 1 s~27. The equilibrium described by Yroposition I
Is Lhen gIVCII by
p' - 2[3cs -} s(3cs)1~~]1~~ - 2(3cs)1~2, a' -[1 f s(3cs)-1~~]1~~ - l. (5)
The equilibrium characterization by Proposition 1 is derived from the first order con-
ditions that the profit maximizing marketing strategies xA and xB necessarily have to
satisfy. Unfortunately, the first order conditions are not sufficient for profit maximiza-
tion. The reason is that the firms' profit functions are not jointly concave in (p;, r;,~; ).
Because of this non-concavity, one has to be careful that no seller can increase his profit.
by, for instance, simultaneously lowering his price and his advertising intensity. The
following assumption guarantees that such deviations from (p', r', a') are not profitable.
Assumption 1: For all 0 G al C aZ G 1, k(.) satisfies k'(a2)~k'(al) ~(I t at - al)2.
This assumption requires the cost function k(.) to be suíficiently convex, which allows
us to establish existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2: Let k(.) satàsjy Assumption 1. Then, there às an equiliórium (xA,xB)
S7lftt til(ti TA - TH - (p ,r',.~').
Within the family of cost functions k(a) - cad, Assumption I is satisfied as long as
a~ 3. Therefore, the above example satisfies this assumption and the solution described
by equation (5) constitutes an equilibrium outcome. Assumption 1 guarantees that the
seller's optimal advertising int,ensity is not very sensitive to price changes. In general,
the optimal distribution rate .~; is positively related to seller i's price p;. Under Assump-
tion 1, however, a given reduction in p; has only a small impact on the optimal ~;. This
ensures that seller i cannot gain from setting p; c p' together with a; c a'.11
Even though the manufacturer's profit function is not jointly concave in (p;, r, a, ),
it. is continuous. This implies Lhat there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium when
Assumption 1 is not satisfied (sa~ llasgupta and Maskin (1986)). In such au eyuilibriurn
the sellers choose a random marketing policy. Since for a given a„ seller i's profit is con-
cave in (p;,r;), it follows from the first order conditions that the optimal p; is positively
related with a,. Similarly, the optimal r; increases with p;. ln the mixed strategy equi-
librium, therefore, each seller chooses a; stochastically and he combines higher values of
a; with higher prices p; and higher coupon values r;.
5 Welfare
ln this section we investigate how the market participants' welfare depends on the ad-
vertising cost k(.) and the transportation cost parameter s. As a measure of consumer
welfare, wc, consider aggregate consumer surplus, C, which depends on (p',r', a') ac-
cording to
C(p', r', a') - 2(1 -.1')(v - p') ~- 2a' f max[v - p', v - p' ~ r' - s]~s ds. (6)
lo,a]
The first term represents the utility of the consumers who do not receive a coupon. The
other consumers' purchasing decision depends on the rebate r' and the switching cost
s. Consumer s will make use of the coupon only if v- p' ~ v- p' ~ r' - s. Finally, we
define social welfare as the sum of producer profits and consumer surplus. We begin by
studying the relation between welfare and s.
Proposition 3: The sellers' equilibrium profit is increasing in s. Consumer surplus and
socia! wel~are are decreasing in s.
Not surprisingly, producer profits are positively related to the level of brand loyalty
or geographical differentiation. When the sellers are able to choose products, they will
seek to maximize the degree of market segmentation. The principle of `maximal differ-
entiation', as described by D'Aspremont et al. (1979), remains valid when couponing
is introduced. An increase in s has a two-fold impact on consumer surplus: First, the12
consumer has to pay higher prices. Second, he ís more likely to receive a coupon. The
above result demonstrates that the first negative efiect outweighs the second positive
effect. Indeed, as was shown before, the coupon redemption rate decreases with s. Fi-
nally, social welfare is negatively related to s: The higher s, the higher is the coupon
distribution intensity, a', and the number of coupons actually redeemed, a'~(2 f a').
This means that the resources spend on couponing and the consumers' aggregate travel
costs increase with s.
To study the impact of the advertising cost on equilibrium payoffs, we consider cost
functions of the type k(a) - cao-. An increase in the parameter c then shifts the cost
function upwards so that also the marginal cost of advertising is increased.
Proposition 4: Let k(a) - cav, with o 1 3. Then equilibrium profits and social surplus
are increasing in c. Consumer surplus is decreasing in c.
Surprisingly, an increase in the cost of couponing makes the sellers better off. Of
course, seller i gains by a reduction in c when the rnarketing strategy x~ of his opponent
is kept fixed. In addition to this direct effect, however, there is an indirect effect. Lower
advertising costs make competition more aggressive. This reduces the sellers' prices and
their equilibrium profits. A similar observation has been made in models of informative
advertising (see Bester and Petrakis (1992), and Peters (1984)), where a tax on advertis-
ing may increase profits. Since higher couponing costs increase prices and reduce coupon
distribution, the consumers become worse off. Aggregate welfare, however, is increased.
'1'h~~ intuiliun is t.hal. Ih~~ s~,lh~i:v wasle- h~ss resuuni~s un ~unpuning cuusutni~rs and Lhr
consurners save on switching costs.
6 Conclusions
Thís paper has studied couponing as a price discrimination device in oligopolistic com-
petition. By couponing those consumers who have some preference for a competing
brand, a seller can increase his market share. Coupons may compensate the consumer13
for a costly movement to another brand. In contrast with the repeat-purchasc explana-
tion, coupons reduce consumer switching costs in our model. The price discrimination
model predicts that couponing intensifies competition between the sellers, leading to
lower prices and profits.
Our simple model may be extended in several interesting directions. We assumed
that all the consumers have the same valuation for the good. As a result, total demand
was fixed. Introducing some dispersion of consumer valuations would make aggregate
demand elastic. As couponing increases competition, it would raise aggregate output.
Couponing may have a positive effect on social welfare if the elasticity of demand is
sufficiently high. Also, the value of the coupon relative to the príce of the product would
presumably depend on the distribution of consumer valuations.
Removing the symmet,ric st,ructure of the modcl would be another interest,ing ex-
tension. In our n odel, the sellers were identical and so they used the same marketing
strategy. This wc;uld no longer be the case when different production technologies are
considered. An e:ctension along these lines could provide insights into the relation be-
tween a firm's efficiency and its marketing policy. Similarly, one could study the role of
a firm's size whet~ the number of consumers differs across market segments. One might
expect that smaller firms have a higher incentive to distribute coupons because they can
gain more by attracting consumers from other market segments.19
7 Appendix
Lemma 1: Let r, 6e an optimal marketing strategy for firm i given that firm j chooses
x~. Then the foRowing must hold: (i) p~ - s G p; - r; G p;; (iiJ p~ - s G p; G p~ f s; and
(iii) p, ~ min~p~ - r~, 0.5p~].
Proof: If p; - r; 7 p„ no consumer will switch from location j to firm í. Therefore, firm
i could increase its profit by not mailing coupons. If p; - r; G p~ - s, all consumers at
location j who receive a coupon from firm i strictly prefer to switch. Therefore, firm i
could increase its profits by slightly decreasing r;. This proves (i). To provc (ii), not~
that all consumers at j strictly prefer to switch to firm i if p; G p~ - s. 'I'herefore, firm i
could increase its profit by slightly increasing p;. If p; ~ p~ t s, no consumer at location
i buys from firm i. But then firm i could get higher profits by setting p; slightly below
p~ f s, while keeping p; - r; constant. Finally, (iii) must hold because keeping p; - r;
fixed and increasing p; increases II; if p; G min[p~ - r„ 0.5p~]. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Let a, be an optimal marketing strategy for firm i given that firm j chooses
z~. Then p; - r, - 0.5p~.
Proof: By the definition of I7;(.), p; - r; must maximize (p; - r;)D[p~ -(p; - r;)]. By
lemma 1, the solution must satisfy the first order condition p~ - 2(p; - r;) - 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Lemma 2 implies r' - 0.5p'. This together with the first
order condition for the opt,imal choice of a; implies k'(a') - (p'~2]2~s. We show firm
A cannul gain by scl.l.ing p~ 1 p' only if p' ~ s~(1 t 0.5a'). By Icrnma'l, firm A will
optimally set pA - rA - 0.5p'. Therefore, the profit from choosing pA E(p`,p' f s)
together with aA - a' equals
1In -~Pa(I - a')(s - pn -F P) f pna'(s - Pn f 0.5p') t a'(P~2)~]~s - k(a~). (7)
This impli~s í3llale3pn - I~' - 2pn f P(1 - 0.5~'))Js. If p' G s~(1 t O.~ia'), then for pA
close enough to p' one gets r3fl A~ópA ~ 0 so that firm A could gain by charging a price
slightly abovc p'. As a result, onc must havc p' ? s~(1 f 0.5a').15
Finally, we show that firm A cannot gain by setting pA C p' only if p' C s~(1 f0.5a').
The profit from choosing pA E(p' - r',p') together with aA - a' and pA - rA - 0.5p'
equals
nA - PA(l - a') ~[PA~~(s - PA f 0.5p') f pA(I -~')(P -PA)]~~5 (g)
fa`(P ~2)2~s - k(a').
Therefore, anA~apA -[s - 2pA f p'(1 - 0.5a')]~s. If p' ) s~(1 -~ 0.5a'), then for pA
close enough to p' one gets allA~apA G 0 so that firm A could gain by charging a price
slightly below p'. As a result, one must have p' c s~(1 f 0.5a'). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let firm B use the strategy aB -(p', r',a`) such that p', r',
and a' satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1. We will show that adopting the same
strategy is a best response for firrn A.
First we show that choosing some pA 1 p' is not profitable for firm A. By lemma
2, firm A will optimally set pA - rA - 0.5p'. Therefore, the profit frorn choosing pA E
(p',p` f s) together with some aA equals
IIA-ÍPA(1-í~~)(S-PAfP )fPAa~(s-PAf0.5p')f~A[P'~2121~s-k(~A). (9)
From the first order condition it follows that firm A will optimally set aA - a'. This
implies
allA~aPA -[(1 - a')(s - 2pA f P') f~'(s - 2pA f 0.5P)]~s c 0, (10)
where the in~yuality follows from pA ~ p' - s~(I f 0.5a') Thus, firm A cannot gain by
adopting sorne strategy xA ~ (li ,r',~') such thai. pq ~ p'.
'1'o complcte thc argumcul., wc show that choosi~ig somc pA C)i is not pro(itabl~~
for firm A. As firm A will optimally set pA - rA - 0.5p`, its profit írom choosing
pA E(p' - r', p') together with some aA equals
nA - PA(I - a') f [pAa'(s - pA -6 0.5p') f pA(I - aA)(P - PA)]~s (11)
~Í~q[p',i]2,3 - k(~A).16
For any pA c p' the optima] choice of aA has to satisfy the first order condition pA(p' -
pA) - s[k'(a') - k'(~A)], so that aA G a' by convexity of k(.) This equation can be
rewritten as
PÁ - pnP f s[k'(a') - k'(an)1 - 0. (12)
Note that p'2 - 9s(k'(a') - k'(aA)] - 4sk'(aA) and that, by lemma 1, pA ~ 0.5n .
Therefore, the above equation yields the solution
pA - 0.5p' f [sk'(an)1'~Z. (13)
As 2pA - p' - 2[sk'(aA)]r~~ and s- 0.5~'p' - p' - 2[sk'(a')]r~2, differentiation of fIA
yields
BIIA~aP.r - [s - 0.5a'p' - (1 t a' - an)(2Pa - P )]Is (14)
- [2[sk'(~')1'~' - 2(1 f ~' - aA)[sk'(~A)]'~21~s.
Since aA c a', A~sumption 1 implies 8IIA~8pA ~ 0. Thus firm A cannot gain by adopt-
ing some strategy xA ~(p',r',a') such that pA G p'. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Equilibrium profits are given by
n~ - F~ - a'p'2~4s - k(~~) - 4k'(~~)(1 -f- 0.5a') - a'k'(a') - k(~") (15)
- 4k'(a') f a'k'(a') - k(a').
By convexity of k(.}, II; is increasing in a'. As a result, s and II; are positively related
bccause a' is an incrcasing (rmct,ion o( s.
Consumc~r surplus cquals
C - 2v - 2p' f a'p'2~4s - 2v - 8k'(a')(1 t 0.5a') f a'k'(a'j (I6)
- 2v - 8k'(a') - 3a'k'(a')
As an increase in s raises a', this proves that consumer surplus is decreasing in d.
Social welfare equals W- 2II; f C- 2v - 2k(a') - a'k'(a"). An increase in s leads
to a higher value of a' so that the social welfare is reduced. Q.E.D.17
Proof of Proposition 4: For k(a) - caa one has ak'(J~)Ia - k(a). Therefore
n~ - P - a'p'~I4s - a'k'(a')Io - P~~1 - (1 -f a)a'p'I(4sn)]. (17)
But a'p' - 2(s - p'). Since an increase in k'(1) raises p', a'p' falls whcn c is increased.
This proves that !l, and c are positively related.
By the proof of Propositíon 3, social welfare equals
W- 2v - 2a'k'(a')I~ - a~k~(~~) - 2v -(o f 2)a~P~I(4~s) (18)
- 2v -(o f 2)(s - P )P I(2as).
Since 2sI3 C p' c s, W is increasing in p'. Therefore, an increase in c will raise W.
Finally, as an increase in c raises p' and lowers a', each consumer's equilibrium utility
will de.crease with c. Accordingly, consumer surplus is a decreasing function of c. Q.E.D.18
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